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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee does not dispute the statement of jurisdiction 
set forth on page 1 of the Brief of Appellant herein. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellee respectfully suggests that the statement of 
issues presented for review found in the State's opening brief is, 
like the statutues at issue herein, unnecessarily convoluted and 
complex. Appellee suggests that the following statement of issues 
is simpler and less redundant. 
ISSUE It ARE THE TERMS "ISOLATED TRANSACTION", 
"UNDERWRITER" AND "PUBLIC OFFERING" USED IN SECTION 61-1-
14(2) TO DEFINE TRANSACTIONS EXEMPT FROM CERTAIN 
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES 
ACT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE? 
ISSUE II: ARE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS UNDER SECTION 61-1-
3(1) BARRED BECAUSE THE DEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
SECTION 61-1-14(2) WHICH IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, AND 
SECTION 61-1-13(2) WHICH DEFINES THE TERM "AGENT", 
RENDERS THE APPLICABLE DEFINITION OF "AGENT" 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. 
ISSUE III: IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS CASE DID THE TRIAL 
COURT ERR BY APPLYING THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF SECTION 61-1-
14.5 AND RULING THAT THE BURDEN OF PROVING AN EXEMPTION 
TO THE DIFINITION OF "AGENT' RESTED WITH THE DEFENDANT? 
Appellee concedes that City of Logan v. Utah Power & 
Light Co.. 796 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1990), and cases cited therein 
sets forth the appropriate standard by which the questions raised 
by the State's appeal herein should be reviewed. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
In addition to the constitutional provisions and statutes 
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cited in the State's opening brief on appeal, appellee suggests 
that the following additional provisions of the Utah Code are 
relevant to a proper resolution of the issues raised in this 
appeal. 
76-1-501. Presumption of innocense - "Element of the 
offense" defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed 
to be innocent: until each element of the offense charged 
against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the 
absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
76-1-502. Negating defense by allegation or proof - When 
required. 
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense: 
(1) By allegation in an information, 
indictment, or other charge; or 
(2) By proof, unless: 
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as 
a result of evidence presented at trial, either by the 
prosecution or the defense; or 
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense 
and the defendant has presented evidence of such 
affirmative defense. 
Section 76-1-504. Affirmative defense presented by 
defendant. 
Evidence of an affirmative defense as defined by this 
code or other statutes shall be presented by the 
defendant. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS 
Appellant believes that the State, in stating 
the issues it believes to be before the Court in this 
case, has essentially asked the same question three times 
in issues 2, 3 and 4. The fact that it has deemed it 
necessary to do so supports Appellee's contention that 
the statutory scheme requiring registration of "agents" 
embodied in the Utah Uniform Securities Act is awkward, 
confusing and unconstitutionally vague. The following 
2 
arguments lend further support to that proposition. 
First, Section 61-1-13(2) requires that in 
order to be found to have acted as an "agent" a person 
must have "represent(ed) a broker/dealer or issuer", and 
have acted "in effecting or attempting to effect 
purchases or sales of securities". However, the section 
goes on to state that a person may be deemed not to be 
acting as an agent even if he meets the foregoing 
conditions if (1) he represents an issuer (rather than a 
broker-dealer), and (2) receives no commission or other 
remuneration and, (3) [for purposes of this case] effects 
transactions exempted by Section 61-1-14(2). 
Three kinds of transactions exempted by that 
section are as follows: 
Section 61-1-14(2)(a), isolated transactions 
whether effected through a broker/dealer or not; 
Section 61-1-14 (2) (d) , transactions between the 
issuer or other person on whose behalf the offering is 
made and an underwriter or among underwriters; and 
Section 61-1-14(2)(n), transactions not 
involving any "public offering". 
The problem is that The Utah Uniform Securities Act does 
not define the terms "isolated transaction", "underwriter" or 
"public offering"; and the technical meaning of the terms is not 
self-evident. Under Section 61-1-13(2) one must understand the 
meaning of those terms in order to ascertain what an "agent" is 
not; for without knowing that, one cannot determine what an agent 
is. Thus, a reasonable man who desires to comply with the law 
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cannot, by reading Sections 61-1-13(2) and the targeted provisions 
of Section 61-1-14(2) determine when he will be deemed to be acting 
as an agent under the Utah Uniform Securities Act. Therefore, 
under prevailing case authority, Section 61-1-13(2) is 
unconstitutionally vague. 
Second, Section 61-1-3(1) makes it unlawful for any 
person to transact busi less in Utah as either a broker/dealer or an 
"agent" unless the person is licensed under the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act; and Section 61-1-21 provides thai: a willful 
violation of Section 61-1-3(1) of that Act is a felony. Because 
the section of the act which defines "agent" for purposes of 
Section 61-1-3(1) is unconstitutionally vague, Section 61-1-3(1) is 
itself, equally vague. That being the case, criminal prosecution 
for violation of Section 61-1-3(1) initiated pursuant to the 
authority of Section 61-1-21 is constitutionally barred. 
Third, Appellee will address Appellant's argument that 
the trial court erred by ruling that according to its terms, 
Section 61-1-14.5 placed the "burden of proving" that his conduct 
entitled him to an exception from the definition of agent found in 
Section 61-1-13(2) squarely upon Arnold Swenson. Appellee will 
contend that though the State's admission that under Utah law the 
State must prove the unavailability of exemptions from the agent 
registration provision of Section 61-1-3(1) in criminal 
prosecutions for violating the section is constitutionally correct, 
the trial court in this case did not err by applying the contrary 
provision of Section 61-1-14.5 because (1) neither this Court nor 
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the Utah Court of Appeals has ever held that Section 61-1-14.5 
should not be applied according to its terms in criminal cases; (2) 
imposition of the procedural scheme necessary to effect the State's 
proposal is a matter for the legislature and was not a matter that 
could have been dealt with by the District Court. 
As a corrolary to the foregoing proposition, Appellee will 
argue that even if this Court should adopt the palliative measure 
urged upon it by the State, any judicial construction necessary to 
render the applicable statutes constitutional will have been 
pronounced after the acts for which Appellant was charged were 
committed. No such construction should be retroactively applied to 
permit this case to be tried. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE DEFINITION OP "AGENT" FOUND IN SECTION 61-1-13(2) 
OF THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
BECAUSE THE ACT DOES NOT DEFINE TERMS USED IN SECTIONS 
ESTABLISHING EXCEPTIONS FROM THE DEFINITION FOUND THEREIN. 
In order to establish that a person is an "agent" under 
the definition found in Section 61-1-13(2) of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act the State must demonstrate that (1) the accused 
person is "any individual other than a broker/dealer who represents 
a broker/dealer or issuer - (2) in effecting or attempting to 
effect purchases or sales of securities. The section then goes on 
to state circumstances in which an individual meeting those 
criteria will, nevertheless, not be deemed to be acting as an 
agent, to-wit; cases in which the person (a) "represents an issuer 
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[but not an underwriter] and who (b) receives no commission or 
other remuneration and [for purposes of this case] (c) effects 
transactions exempted by subsection 61-1-14(2). 
Amongst the eighteen kinds of transactions exempted under 
Section 61-1-14(2) are "any isolated transaction, whether effected 
through a broker/dealer or not" (Section 61-1-14(2)(a)); "any 
transaction between the issuer or other person on whose behalf the 
offering is made and an underwriter, or among underwriters" 
(Section 61-1-14(2)(d)); and "any transaction not involving a 
public offering" (Section 61-1-14(2)(n)). 
The problem is that none of the underlined terms are 
defined by the Utah Uniform Securities Act. Appellee contends that 
this failure renders the definition of agent found in Section 61-1-
13(2) unconstitutional on its face both under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I Section 
7 of the Constitution of Utah. 
The Appellant has correctly cited state and federal 
authority for the proposition that "... a criminal violation should 
be described with sufficient certainty so that persons of ordinary 
intelligence, desiring to obey the law, may know how to govern 
themselves in conformity with it". State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 
1183 (Utah 1981); citing Greaves v. State. 528 P.2d 805 (Utah 
1974), Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (33 L. Ed. 2d 222 
(1972), 92 Sup. Ct. 2294, and U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 98 L. 
Ed. 2d 989, 74 Sup. Ct. 808 (1954). Appellant is also correct when 
it argues that under Kent Club v. Toronto. 305 P.2d 870 (Utah, 
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1957) this Court should not declare any statute unconstitutional 
until it has attempted, without success, to construe the statute so 
as to give effect to its language in a manner which will meet 
constitutional muster by reasonably advising the citizens of their 
legal obligations thereunder. 
Having correctly gotten this far, the State then cites a 
number of cases which are not in point in an attempt to demonstrate 
that the provisions of the Utah Uniform Securities Act which are at 
issue in this case are not unconstitutional. For instance, Favor 
v. State, 389 S. 2d 556 (Ala. Cr. App., 1980) is not in point 
because the issue in that case was the apparent conflict between a 
provision defining the penalties for willful violations of the 
Alabama Securities Act and a different requirement which provided 
that scienter need not be alleged or proved in prosecutions 
involving the sale of unregistered securities or in the failure to 
register as a dealer or salesman. The court merely held that those 
two sections were not in conflict; that though the state must prove 
scienter in fraud cases, it is not unconstitutional for the code to 
punish registration violations without any showing of mens rea 
except that the defendant knew what he was doing when he committed 
the prohibited act. 
Similarly, Hewett v. State. 672 S.W. 2d 533 (Tex. App. 5 
Dist., 1984) has little or nothing to do with the issues presented 
in this case. In that case, the appellant had been convicted of 
fraud for making misrepresentations of "material fact." On appeal, 
he argued that the term "material fact" was vague. In support of 
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his argument he cited a prior Texas case in which the appellate 
court had suggested that though the language of the statute which 
prohibited "omittfing] to state a material fact necessary in order 
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they are made, not misleading" was saved from 
unconstitutional vagueness by the clarifying language found at the 
end of the sentence, the phrase "material fact", standing alone, 
might be unconstitutionally vague. However, in Hewett, the court 
ruled, in reliance on state and federal authorities to the effect 
that the construction of the applicable statute must be made in 
light of the facts of the case at hand and that since defendant 
Hewett had misrepresented the company's assets by 3 3 million 
dollars and omitted to mention that he had three prior theft 
convictions and a probation revocation which were on appeal, the 
questioned phrase was fully sufficient to make it clear to him that 
misrepresentations and omissions of that calibre were "material". 
In its holding, the court cited Farmer v. State, 540 S.W. 2d 721 
(Texas Criminal Appeals 1976) for the proposition that all that is 
required for a statute to meet constitutional muster is that it be 
understandable when measured by "common understanding and 
practice". 
So far as undersigned counsel can tell, State v. Martin, 
187 N.W. 2d 576 (S.D. 1971) is mis-cited for any proposition 
involving an agent registration requirement because, though the 
South Dakota agent registration provision is quoted as part of the 
statute under which the defendant was prosecuted, the opinion of 
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the court says nothing at all about that provision but deals 
exclusively with the appellant's conviction under the anti-fraud 
prohibitions of the statute. The language quoted at the bottom of 
page 26 of appellant's brief clearly relates only to the antifraud 
prohibition of the statute in question, and is a quote from U.S. v. 
Lillev, 291 F. Supp. 989 (D.C.S.D. Texas 1968) which was a case 
decided under under the anti-fraud provisions of Section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
thereunder (See 15 U.S.C. Section 78(j)(b) and 17 C.F.R. Section 
240.10b-5), and in which the deciding court held that the "no 
knowledge" exception to the penalty provision of Section 10(b) 
could not save the appellants from prison sentences because those 
defendants had been charged with knowledge of the statutes and 
regulations governing the sales of securities. Both Martin and 
Lilley are absolutely inapposite. 
In point of fact, Appellant has not cited so much as a 
single case which has ruled on the constitutionality of any group 
of statutory provisions which are substantially similar to the 
convoluted regulatory scheme created by the relationship between 
Sections 61-1-3(1), 61-1-13(2), 61-1-14(2)(a), (d), and (n) , and 
61-1-14.5 of the Utah code. That is not to say, however, that such 
case authority is not available. In People v. Dempster. 242 N.W. 
2d 381 (Mich. 1976) the court dealt with an appeal from a 
conviction under the Michigan Uniform Securities Act in which 
defendant, convicted of distributive and anti-fraud violations of 
the Michigan securities act, appealed claiming that the "open ended 
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trust account" instruments she had sold were "commercial paper" 
exempt from registration under the act. Appellant argued that 
because the phrase "commercial paper" was not defined in the 
Michigan Securities Act, but was defined by the Michigan Uniform 
Commercial Code in a manner which fairly described the instruments 
she had sold, the court was required to read the UCC definition 
into the Securities Act, declare that the instruments she had sold 
were exempt from registration, and reverse her conviction on the 
registration counts. The Michigan Supreme Court refused to adopt 
this argument, holding that to read the UCC's expansive definition 
of commercial paper into the Securities Act would be inconsistent 
with the Securities Act's purpose to "protect against swindles". 
(242 N.W.2d at 385.) The court then went on to address 
Appellant's second argument that whether or not she won or lost on 
her affirmative claim that the instruments she sold were exempt 
from registration, the "commercial paper" exemption found in the 
Michigan Securities Act was unconstitutional because the Act did 
not define the term. In dealing with this claim, the court relied 
upon the following exemplary statement of the constitutional 
requirements of specificity: 
A criminal statute must be "sufficiently 
explicit to inform those who are subject to it 
what conduct on their part will render them 
liable to its penalties". Connally v. General 
Construction Co.. 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 
126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). "No one may be 
required at peril of life, liberty or property 
to speculate as to the meaning of penal 
statutes." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 
451, 453, 59 S.Ct. 618, 619, 83 L.Ed. 888 
(1939). "(A)mbiguity concerning the ambit of 
criminal statutes should be resolved in favor 
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of lenity." Rewis v. U.S. , 401 U.S. 808, 812, 
91 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971). 
Exemptions and provisos within a criminal 
statute must be defined with the same 
specificity as the prohibitive language of the 
statute. Cline v. Frink Dairy Co.. 274 U.S. 
445, 47 S.Ct. 681, 71 L.Ed. 1146 (1927). 
Applying these standards, the court had no difficulty holding, with 
little factual analysis, that the term "commercial paper" standing 
by itself was not sufficiently definite to sustain a criminal 
conviction. 242 N.W.2d at 389. 
Appellee commends the principles relied upon by the 
Michigan court to this court in dealing with the terms "isolated 
transaction", "underwriter" and "public offering", and suggests 
that under those principles, none of those terms passes 
constitutional muster. 
Like the term "commercial paper" dealt with in Dempster, 
none of those terms are defined by the Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
The terms "underwriter" and "public offering" are borrowed from 
Sections 4(1) and 4(2), respectively, of the Securities Act of 1933 
(15 U.S.C. Section 77(d)(1) and 77(d)(2); and "underwriter" is 
extensively defined by Section 2(11) of the act, 15 U.S.C. Section 
77(b)(11). Appellant argues that because Section 61-1-27 U.C.A. 
which requires that the Utah Uniform Securities Act is to be 
construed "to coordinate the interpretation and administration of 
this chapter with the related federal regulation", this Court 
should read the definition of the term "underwriter" found in the 
Securities Act of 1933 into the Utah Uniform Securities Act 
wholesale. This notion cannot be sustained under the rules of 
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statutory construction for at least three reasons. First, Section 
2(11) of the federal act had already been the law for more than 
thirty years when the Utah act was first enacted. If the Utah 
Legislature had wanted to adopt that definition it could easily 
have done so. The fact that it chose not to do so stands as strong 
evidence that the Utah Legislature intended to affirmatively reject 
the Securities Act definition of "underwriter" as the definition to 
be applied in construing the Utah act. Second, the term 
'underwriter" is used with the terms "issuer" and "dealer" (both 
defined in the Utah act) in defining a broad exemption from 
registration of securities. See Section 4(1) of the Securities Act 
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. Section 77(d)(1). The fact that this whole 
category of exemptions has been rejected in the Utah act suggests 
that our legislature may not have been enthralled with the 
convoluted definition of "underwriter" found in the federal act. 
Finally, if the Legislature had intended to adopt the federal 
definition of "underwriter" or, for that matter, "public offering", 
it must have been reminded of that option when it adopted the 
general language of Section 61-1-27. That it did not utilize that 
opportunity makes it clear that it did not intend that result. 
The term "public offering" is a term of art in securities 
parlance which is not defined by either the Utah Securities Act or 
the federal Securities Act of 1933. However, the meaning of the 
term as employed in the federal act has been enlightened by a long 
series of rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission under Section 19(a) of the 1933 Act. See, e.g., 17 
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C.F.R. Sections 230.146 (now repealed), 230.152, 230.285, 231.4552, 
230.5121. The term "isolated transaction" is not used in the 
federal securities acts, and is not defined in the Utah act. The 
Utah Securities Division has not, despite the example set by the 
SEC, adopted any rule or regulation pursuant to Section 61-1-24 or 
otherwise in which it has defined or explained the meanings of 
either of those terms as they are employed in the act. Without 
more than is found in readily available interpretive sources, each 
of these terms lacks sufficient definition to "give a person of 
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is 
forbidden". See Coates v. Cincinatti, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), 
Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) and Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). 
II. 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS UNDER SECTION 61-1-3(1) 
ARE BARRED BECAUSE THE DEPENDENT RELATIONAHIP 
BETWEEN SECTION 61-1-14(2) WHICH IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
VAGUE, AND SECTION 61-1-13(2) WHICH DEFINES THE TERM 
"AGENT", RENDERS THE APPLICABLE DEFINITION OF 
"AGENT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. 
One need only read the language of Section 61-1-13(2) 
with care to see that unless one is able to determine that he is 
not an "agent" because, though he may have representated a broker-
dealer or issuer in effecting a sale of securities, he may also 
have (1) represented an issuer, not a dealer, and (2) received no 
commission or remuneration, and (3) effected a transaction exempt 
under section 61-1-14(2)), one cannot ascertain whether his conduct 
brings him within the provision of Section 61-1-3(1) which 
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prohibits him from effecting certain transactions unless he is 
registered as an "agent" under [the Utah Uniform Securities Act]. 
Since, as has been demonstrated above, Section 61-1-14(2) fails to 
identify transactions which a person may effect without being 
deemed an agent with the required specificity, it is impossible for 
a person to reasonably ascertain when the transaction he intends to 
effect will bring him within the definition of that term. Hence, 
the dependent relationship between those two provisions renders 
both of them equally unconstitutional. 
In Dempster, supra, the Michigan court relied on the wise 
rule gleaned from Cline v. Frank Dairy Co. , also supra, to the 
effect that exceptions to criminal prohibitions must be defined 
with "the same specificity as the prohibitive language of the 
statute." Section 61-1-3(2) plainly prohibits acting as an 
"agent" unless one is registered under the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act. The language of this prohibitive section is crystal clear. 
However, as has been seen above, the language defining exceptions 
to the application of that rule is unconstitutionally vague. 
Application of the foregoing maxim makes it clear that the 
unconstitutionality of Sections 61-1-13 2) and 61-1-14(2)(a), (d) 
and (n) , in turn, renders Section 61-1-3(2), which is dependent on 
them, likewise unconstitutional. 
III. 
IN THE CONTEXT OP THIS CASE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
BY APPLYING THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF SECTION 61-1-14.5 
AND RULING THAT THE BURDEN OF PROVING EXEMPTIONS TO 
THE DEFINITION OF "AGENT RESTED WITH THE DEFENDANT. 
Both the form and substance of Section 61-1-14.5 are so 
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simplistic that there can be no doubt about the legislature's 
intention to vest the burden of proving that the transactions he 
effected brought him within the "exception" to the definition of 
"agent" squarely upon Arnold Swenson. Nevertheless, Appellant now 
concedes that this statute is wrong, and that the "...burden of 
disproving (if necessary) the existence of a Transactional 
Exemption, falls squarely upon the state in a criminal case." 
Appellant's Brief at page 15. 
Unfortunately, the willingness of the executive branch of 
government to lay aside the enactments of our Legislature is not 
enough to cure the problems raised by the statutory provisions at 
issue in this case. 
1. No prior judicial rulings. Neither this Court nor 
the Utah Court of Appeals has ever ruled that Section 61-1-14.5 is 
unconstitutional or otherwise invalid when applied to criminal 
prosecutions; and neither court has suggested that trial judges are 
at liberty to simply ignore it. On November 13, 1990, Section 
61-1-14(2) was part of the law which Judge Frederick was sworn to 
uphold and apply. It cannot be error for him to have done so. 
2. The impropriety of judicial amendment of applicable 
statutes. The fact that Section 61-1-14.5 stands upon the books 
unchanged is incontrovertible evidence that the Legislature has not 
yet recognized the error which the Attorney General now admits. 
The question is: "Who should fix it?" The State says this Court is 
at liberty to do it by the simple device of holding that rather 
than meaning what it plainly says, Section 61-1-14.5 makes 
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establishment of an exception from the definition of "agent" an 
"affirmative defenses" so that once a defendant has adduced some 
evidence to support his claim to exception, the burden of proving 
that the defendant's conduct did not entitle him to the claimed 
exception shifts back to the state. 
In support of its claim, the State relies primarily upon 
State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775 (Utah App. 1990) which involved the 
following language of Section 76-10-1801, U.C.A. which prohibits 
Communications Fraud. 
(7) It is an affirmative defense to 
prosecution under this section that the pretenses , 
representations, promises or material omissions made or 
omitted by the defendant were not made or omitted 
knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Appellant's complaint in Tebbs, supra, was that Section 76-10-1801 
shifted to defendant the burden of disproving an essential element 
of the crime, i.e. that of a culpable mental state. The Court of 
Appeals disagreed on the basis that (1) despite its literal 
language, the Legislature's intention when it enacted Section 76-
10-1801(7) was not so much to establish an "affirmative defense" as 
it was to make it absolutely clear that proof beyond a reaonable 
doubt that the defendant's conduct was knowing or reckless is 
required for conviction of Communications Fraud; and (2) that even 
if the statute were to be construed to establish an "affirmative 
defense", that would not, under the affirmative defense cases cited 
in the opinion, shift to the defendant the burden of proving his 
defense. That would merely require defendant to produce "some 
evidence" of the defense. Once he had done so, the burden of 
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disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt would shift back 
to the State. Citing State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688 (Utah Ct. 
App. 19890, State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 21 (1985) and State v. Wood, 
648 P.2d 71, 82 n. 7 (Utah), cert denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). 
If, like Section 76-10-1801(1), Section 61-1-14.5 
provided that -
[It is affirmative defense to prosecution under section 
61-1-3(2) that defendant was not an agent within the 
meaning of Section 61-1-13(2) because, among other 
things, the transactions he effected or attempted to 
effect were exempt under Section 61-1-14(2).] -
then Tebbs would be authority for the proposition that the section 
is constitutional. However, the statute construed in Tebbs does 
not read like Section 61-1-14.5 for that section does not use plain 
language to shift the burden of proving a defense to the defendant 
in a criminal case. If we paraphrase Section 76-10-1801(7) which 
is construed in Tebbs so it reads like Section 61-1-14.5, the 
former section would read as follows: 
[(7) In any proceeding under this section, the burden 
of proving that the pretenses, representations, promises, 
or material omissions made or omitted by the defendant 
were not made or omitted knowingly or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth is upon the defendant.] 
In dictum, the Tebbs Court correctly dealt with such a statute in 
the exact manner by which this Court should deal, once and for all, 
with Section 61-1-14.5. 
The crux of defendant's argument is that subsection 
(7) of Section 76-10-1801 shifts to defendant the burden 
of disproving an essential element of the crime, namely 
that of a culpable mental state. If true, this would 
violate the Due Process clauses of the United States and 
Utah Constitutions. "[T]he Due Process Clause protects 
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond 
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a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute 
the crime with which he is charged. [Citations omitted.] 
("A fundamental precept of our criminal law is that the 
State must prove all elements of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt." State v. Sorenson. 758 P. 2d 466, 468-
69 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
From the State's perspective, the problem with Tebbs is 
that unlike the section at issue therein, Section 61-1-14.5 doesn't 
purport to establish any "affirmative defense." Thus, it is not 
sound direct authority for any issue directly raised by this 
appeal. It does not stand for the proposition (urged by the State) 
that this Court ought to rewrite the provisions of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act which are at issue in this case. Appellee 
suspects that the State's inappropriate reliance on Tebbs may have 
been generated by the seductive manner in which the Court of 
Appeals wrote the words "affirmative defense" out of the statute 
for the purpose of one of the case's two holdings. That much 
liberty with the Legislature's intent might be permissible. 
However, Appellee suggests that writing the words "affirmative 
defense" into a section from which they are conspicuously absent as 
the provision was enacted by the Legislature would be conduct 
exceeding the Court's legitimate role in "construing" statutes. 
This is so because affirmative defenses under Utah law 
are not created by the courts but by the Legislature. Relevant 
sections of the Utah Criminal Code are as follows: 
76-1-501. Presumption of innocense - "Element of the 
offense" defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed 
to be innocent until each element of the offense charged 
against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the 
absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
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76-1-502. Negating defense by allegation or proof - When 
required. 
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense: 
(1) By allegation in an information, 
indictment, or other charge; or 
(2) By proof, unless: 
(a) The defense is in issue in the case 
as a result of evidence presented at trial, either by the 
prosecution or the defense; or 
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, 
and the defendant has presented evidence of such 
affirmative defense. 
Section 76-1-504. Affirmative defense presented by 
defendant. 
Evidence of an affirmative defense as defined by this 
code or other statutes shall be presented by the 
defendant. (All Emphasis added.) 
If the legislature had intended the result the State now urges upon 
the Court, the last quoted section would read: 
Evidence of an affirmative defense as defined by this 
code, other statutes, the Court of Appeals of Utah or the 
Utah Supreme Court shall be presented by the defendant. 
Of course, the section does not read that way - and this Court 
should not treat it as if it did. 
Though uttered in response to a ruling of a Court of 
Appeals holding the federal government liable for certain negligent 
conduct in the face of a statute which did not impose liability, 
the Supreme Court, in U.S. v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 612, (1986) 
adopted the following language which contains good advice in the 
context of the instant case: 
As the facts in this case demonstrate, one can well 
understand why the Court of Appeals sought to find a 
principled way to hold the Government responsible for its 
concededly negligent conduct. But our role is to 
effectuate Congress1 intent, and Congress rarely speaks 
more plainly than it has in the provision we apply here. 
If that provision is to be changed, it should be by the 
Congress and not by this Court. (Emphasis added.) 
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The Utah Legislature could not have spoken more plainly than it did 
in Section 61-1-14.5 when it placed the burden of proving 
exceptions to definitions in the Utah Uniform Securities Act on 
defendants and thusf excused the State from proving an element of 
certain criminal offenses enacted as part of the act. The State 
correctly concedes that the provision is unconstitutional. See In 
re Winship. 387 U.S. 358, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970). 
The State argues, in essence, that this Court should remand the 
case to the District Court for trial in which the jury should be 
instructed that it may find Defendant guilty if it finds that : 
Defendant Arnold J. Swenson; 
1. Willfully; 
2. effected or attempted to effect purchases 
or sales of securities; and 
3. Arnold J. Swenson was not registered at the 
time; and 
4. Arnold J. Swenson represented an issuer, 
and did not receive any commission or other remuneration, 
directly or indirectly, for effecting or attempting to 
effect the transactions. 
If you find that Arnold Swenson effected or 
attempted to effect purchases or sales of securities and 
was not registered, but that (1) he represented an issuer 
and not a broker-dealer, and (2) did not receive any 
commission or other remuneration, indirectly or 
indirectly, so so doing, then he might, under certain 
circumstances depending upon the nature of the 
transactions he effected or attempted to effect, come 
within an exception to the definition of "agent, and 
therefore be deemed not to have acted as an "agent" in 
effecting or attempting to effect such sales or purhases 
of securities. 
Even though Utah Uniform Securities Act 
requires Swenson to prove that he is within an exception 
to the definition of agent, it would be impossible for 
him to do so because some of the terms used to define 
certain of the exceptions to the definition are not 
defined by the Act. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Utah has held 
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that the State must disprove that Swenson is within an 
exception to the definition of "agent". Since the State 
cannot prove that he is not entitled to an exemption and 
any better than Swenson could prove that he is entitled 
to it, you must acquit the defendant if you find that (1) 
he represented an issuer and not a broker-dealer, and (2) 
that he received no commission or other remuneration for 
effecting the subject sales of securities. 
Of course, Appellee realizes that the trial jury would not 
literally need to be instructed in detail about the reason for the 
rule it would be required to follow, but there is no escaping the 
fact that most of the substantive law embodied in a truthful 
explanation of the situation presented by this statutory quagmire 
would be judge-made law, fashioned of necessity as a result of a 
legislative error. It is also true that though the Court might 
finesse the burden of proof problem, it plainly can to nothing to 
solve the underlying difficulty posed by the Legislature's failure 
to have defined critical terms employed in Secton 61-1-14(2). A 
judicial solution could not remedy more than half the problem. 
Appellee concedes that Courts have some discretion to 
construe statutes in a way which will preserve their 
constitutionality. However, the extent to which the State urges 
the Court to go to save these statutes goes far beyond mere 
"construction." For after having agreed with the State that the 
law cannot be constitutionally applied as written, the court is 
being called on to elect between a number of possible alternatives 
with implications affecting both the complicated regulatory scheme 
contained in the Utah Uniform Secutities Act and the carefully 
defined rules related to affirmative defenses and notice which are 
contained in the Utah Criminal Code. Where the changes required 
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are that radical, they should be made by the Legislature. 
3. No saving interpretation of relevant provisions which 
this Court may now pronounce can be applied retroactively to 
further prosecution of Appellee. Judge Frederick dismissed this 
case in the District Court because certain provisions of the 
Securities Act are unconstitutional. The State wants this Court to 
construe those sections in a manner which would render them 
constitutional and then reverse Judge Frederick's judgment in the 
District Court on the basis that new judicial contruction. This 
tactic would be inappropriate. 
In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 33 
L.Ed. 2d 222, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (1972) the Supreme Court was required to 
construe an anti-picketing and anti-noise ordinance which had, 
between the date of appellant's conviction and the date the case 
was decided in the Supreme Court, been amended to delete the anti-
picketing provisions. In a footnote, the Court held that it could 
not take into account the later amendment, but was required to rule 
on the statute in its form on the dates when appellant was arrested 
and convicted. 
Even more in point is People v. Dempster, supra, in which 
the Michigan court dealt with a case in which the appellant had 
been convicted of failure to register securities which she claimed 
were exempt under the Michigan Securities Act. In dealing with the 
case on appeal the court held that the exemptive provision to which 
appellant claimed entitlement was vague on its face. However, the 
court fashioned a construction which ruled made the exemptive 
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language constitutional. It was nevertheless required to reverse 
the appellant's conviction based on the following reasoning: 
Thus, while the construction we have placed 
on the commercial paper exemption is valid for 
the future, "it may not be applied 
retroactively, any more than a legislative 
enactment may be, to impose criminal penalties 
for conduct committed at a time when it was 
not fairly stated to be criminal." Bouie v. 
City of Columbia, 412 U.S. 430, 93 S.Ct. 2199, 
37 L.Ed.2d 52 (1973). 
As we recently stated in People v. Bloss, 
394 Mich. 79, 228 N.W.2d 384, 385 (1975): 
"We are persuaded that defendant's 
conviction cannot stand for the 
reason that at the time he did the 
act complained of this Court had not 
construed the **** statute *** to 
proscribe such conduct." 
See also Woll v. Kelly. 297 N.W.2d 578 (Mich. 1979) where the court 
ruled that though statutory vagueness and overbreadth can sometimes 
be cured by judicial construction, the limiting construction must 
have been rendered prior to any conduct resulting in a criminal 
prosecution, citing Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham. 382 U.S. 87 
(1965). 
If, despite Appellee's arguments to the contrary, the 
Court should fashion a construction of the statutes at issue in the 
case which would render them constitional, the court would 
nevertheless be in the same position as was the Michigan court in 
Dempster and would be constrained under the reasoning set forth in 
that case and the others cited above, to affirm the judgment of the 
lower court herein. 
4. Due process and sound judicial policy. There is a 
23 
final reason based in judicial policy and due process for the Court 
to affirm the judgment below. 
The Attorney General is to be commended for his candid 
concession that Section 61-1-14.5 cannot constitutionally be 
applied to claims of exemption in criminal prosecutions under the 
Utah Uniform Securities act. However, it is important for the 
Court to take careful note of the fact that no such admirable 
concession was forthcoming from the Attorney General until his 
office was caught red-handed attempting to convict and perhaps 
imprison a citizen on the basis of an application of the very 
statute he now concedes cannot lawfully be applied. The evidence 
behind this assertion lies in the proposed jury instructions the 
State submitted to Judge Frederick in this case. Those 
instructions contain not a single word to suggest to either the 
trial court or the jury that the State had any obligation to 
disprove the availability of any exception to the definition of 
"agent" which Arnold Swenson might claim, or indeed, that any term 
of Sections 61-1-14.5, 61-1-13(2), 61-1-14 (2) (a) , (d) and (n) , and 
61-1-3(1) should not be strictly ^nplied. Nor did the State 
suggest that it had the burden of isproving exceptions to the 
definition of "agent" in either of the arguments it made to the 
District Court in response to Defendant's motion to dismiss. In 
fact, the entire records stands as testimony to the fact that the 
State fully intended to try and convict Arnold Swenson on a legal 
theory of burden of proof which it now argues is absolutely wrong. 
The series of statutes at issue in this case needs to be 
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amended. There is every expectation that if this Court affirms 
Judge Frederick's dismissal the Legislature will act. However, if 
the Court reverses the District Court and allows this case to be 
tried under the existing law, the Legislature may fail to act; and 
other citizens may be charged and tried under a statutory scheme 
which is unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellee prays the Court 
to affirm the decision of the trial court to dismiss the 
information herein. 
Dated this 4th day of November, 1991. 
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